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Licensing & Law
Who Owns an Avatar?
tyler t. ochoa & jaime banks
c h a p t e r  t h i r t y
Leeroy Jenkins is a videogame character of wide internet and gamer culture fame. 
He first came to popular attention in 2005, in an iconic game scenario in which—
while his cohort was diligently planning a complex dungeon battle—he suddenly 
sprang to life, let out the gravelly battle cry Ah’Leeerooooooy Ah’Jeeennnkiiinnns!, and 
led his compatriots into a slaughter by dragon whelps. He subsequently noted: “At 
least I have chicken” (DBlow2003, 2005/2014). The ridiculousness of this event 
led first to the viral appropriation of the character—crafted into memes about 
everything from riots and warfare to politics and cinema—and this broader recep-
tion led to an increased presence in other videogames and game-related products, 
from the digital card deck-building game Hearthstone (2014) to third-party t-shirts 
and allusions in films like Wreck-It Ralph (Spencer & Moore, 2012). While it’s not 
uncommon for game companies to carry characters from one property to another 
(e.g., the host of characters imported into Super Smash Bros. [1999]), Leeroy’s case 
is different. He wasn’t created by a game company. He was created by a player, Ben 
Schulz, as he played the MMO World of Warcraft (WoW; 2004).
As outlined in various chapters in this volume, both players and game devel-
opers have great influence over how avatars—via their assembled components—
manifest in digital gameplay. Developers craft their foundational platforms and 
draw on those infrastructures to craft dynamic code that enables movements, 
appearances, and abilities. But those potentials call into question whether avatars 
are avatars until they are played—players click avatars into being, customize their 
bodies and attire, drive their actions and interactions, and sometimes bring them 
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outside the gameworld through physical representations. So, given avatars’ joint 
reliance on developers and players, and given legal frameworks such as copyright 
law, who really “owns” a videogame avatar?
The answer was, perhaps, simpler at one point than it is now. Although early 
games offered little to no customization based on variations in rudimentary pixel 
combinations, many modern games afford players a range of creative potential, espe-
cially in the MMO genre. These more advanced systems generally offer customi-
zation along four dimensions: visual appearance (shape and features of the body; 
see chapters by Ahn, Nowak, Robinson, & Calvo, this volume), abilities (types of 
spells and strengths; see chapters by Paul & Milik, this volume), behavior (action of 
the avatar in the gameworld; see Popak, this volume), and dialogue (aural or textual 
speech conveyed as or by the avatar; see Wirman & Jones, this volume). Although 
the latter two dimensions are largely governed by the investment of the player (to the 
extent the player offers inputs to the avatar to engender its movement or speech), 
the former two dimensions are effectively governed by the game’s designers, as the 
technical features offer the “raw ingredients” for players to use in customization 
play. These constraints, however, still often function only as a framework for play-
ers’ engagement of the system. Take, for instance, the MMO City of Heroes (2004). 
In creating an avatar, users select a character archetype (hero or villain), an origin 
(e.g., mutant or magic), a primary and secondary power set, and a visual appear-
ance varying by sex, body type, physique features, head (15 types with 26 features), 
skin color, gear and ornamentation, weapons, auras, animations, name, voice, and 
backstory. Accounting for all possible variations of these factors, players could quite 
literally craft trillions of unique character forms (see Ochoa, 2012). Because the 
game’s potentials don’t account for the unique contributions of players to how an 
avatar “lives” in a gameworld through enacted avatar behaviors and speech, a ques-
tion emerges as to whether players’ contributions to avatars as customized content 
warrant some or all of the legal rights associated with authorship and ownership.
t h e  l i m i t e d  lo g i c  o f  l i c e n s e  a g r e e m e n t s
In addressing this question, the first consideration is a given game’s End-User 
License Agreement (EULA) or Terms of Use (ToU), which define a game devel-
oper’s or publisher’s ownership of the game code and of the copyrightable expres-
sions that players may produce during gameplay. For instance, the WoW ToU 
states that “All rights and title in and to the Service (including without limita-
tion any user accounts, titles, computer code, themes, objects, characters, character 
names, stories, dialogue, catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, animations, 
sounds, musical compositions, audio-visual effects, methods of operation, moral 
rights, any related documentation, ‘applets,’ transcripts of the chat rooms, character 
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profile information, recordings of games) are owned by Blizzard or its licensors” 
(Blizzard, 2012, para. 4). Many developers require players to agree to a EULA 
before they are permitted to access game content, to protect the company’s inter-
ests associated with original and derivative game content.
While such agreements may seem cut and dried, EULAs do not offer a definitive 
answer to the question of avatar ownership. For instance, even if a player consents, 
a EULA may be unenforceable or invalid if a court considers it unconscionable, 
a violation of public policy, or preempted by federal copyright law (see Lemley, 
1999). Certain attributes of authorship and ownership cannot be assigned via con-
tract (e.g., termination rights, see Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 2002). Moreover, 
“reliance on a EULA is intellectually unsatisfying and logically backwards”— 
in considering ownership, it is more prudent to consider “who owns what in the 
absence of an agreement to the contrary” (Ochoa, 2012, p. 965). This approach 
allows default ownership to be determined and, from that baseline, one can con-
sider the validity and enforceability of contractual alterations to the default. Who, 
then, owns an avatar when there is no agreement to the contrary?
c o p y r i g h t  a n d  avata r s  a s  “ w o r k s ”
The issue of default avatar ownership comes in its potential status as a copyright-
able “work of authorship,” and the extent to which developer and player creatively 
contribute to that authorship. “Copyright protection subsists … in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” (Copyright Act of 1976, 
§ 102(a)). Original denotes that a work is independently created and contains a 
minimal (even slight) amount of creativity (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Co., 1991). Copyright protection for original works, however, is lim-
ited to the unique expression of an idea and not the idea itself (Copyright Act, § 
102(b)). For instance, the layout of controls for a golf videogame (e.g., on-screen 
arrows and ball flight path) are driven by minimal necessary functions and so are 
not sufficiently creative or original (Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual Technolo-
gies, Inc., 2005). While early games did not exhibit a great deal of creativity, often 
relying on simple geometric shapes with predictable movement (e.g., Pong, 1972), 
modern games arguably afford a much greater array of creative potential.
A work is fixed “when its embodiment in a copy [a material object such as 
a computer disk] … is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transi-
tory duration” (Copyright Act, § 101). Although computer code driving a game’s 
audiovisual outputs is considered fixed in a permanent form (cf. Stern Electronics, 
Inc. v. Kaufman, 1982), one must consider whether the audiovisual outputs them-
selves are fixed. Because—in addition to the appearance and visibility dimensions 
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of customization—players can manipulate avatars as on-screen content toward 
highly variable behavior and speech, these aspects of avatars arguably are crafted 
in real time and so are not fixed in this fashion. “That makes playing a videogame 
a little like arranging words in a dictionary into sentences or paints on a palette 
into a painting. The question is whether the creative effort in playing a videogame 
is enough like writing or painting to make each performance of a videogame the 
work of the player and not the game’s inventor” (Midway Manufacturing Co. v. 
Arctic Intl. Inc., 1983). Courts’ early answers to this question relied on early games’ 
repetitive nature, such that one could ostensibly replicate a player-created display 
by performing the same movements (Ochoa, 2012). As games have become more 
complex, more reliant on random events, and multiplayer-driven, however, this 
conclusion regarding fixation becomes less persuasive; on-screen events are per-
haps more akin to live, improvised performances, which are not considered “fixed” 
unless they are simultaneously being recorded (Copyright Act, § 101).
Finally, the Copyright Act lists eight kinds of works of authorship—literary, dra-
matic, musical, pantomime/choreographic, pictorial/graphic/sculptural, audiovisual, 
sound recordings, and architectural (§ 102(a)). Videogames fit into two of these 
categories, as they comprise computer code (a copyrightable literary work) and that 
code, when run, generates audiovisual output. Despite this duality, Copyright Office 
regulations provide that a game need only be registered as one of these two types to 
protect both the code and its output (U.S. Copyright Office, 2014, § 721.10(A)).
In considering default ownership of avatars, one must also determine whether 
or not an avatar is a separate work of authorship, apart from its game. The Copy-
right Act fails to provide a definition of “work,” but one can draw an analogy to a 
literary or graphic character that is protected by copyright if it features identifiable, 
persistent traits that make it original and distinctive (e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 
2004). Although many graphic media characters meet this criterion quite easily, it 
is nonetheless difficult to determine whether an avatar constitutes a work distinct 
from the game in which it is embedded. In implementing the “minimum size prin-
ciple” (Hughes, 2005, p. 609), however, the Copyright Office forbids registration 
of words or short phrases (U.S. Copyright Office, 2014, § 313.4(C)), but it allows 
registration of literary, dramatic, or visual works that describe or depict a character 
(U.S. Copyright Office, 2014, §§ 911, 912). Therefore, an audiovisual work that 
features an avatar’s distinctive appearance and attributes could be copyrighted, and 
that copyright would protect that avatar as an aspect of the work.
Assuming an avatar qualifies as a “work of authorship,” is it fixed? While dis-
crete, coded visual properties and algorithms that underlie avatars’ abilities may be 
considered fixed by virtue of their permanent storage on a material object such as a 
hard drive (a game provider’s or a player’s), the dynamic features of an avatar (i.e., 
the enactment of those abilities, and behaviors and speech) may be too fleeting 
or fluid to be deemed fixed. Indeed, because of this fluidity, the engagement and 
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conveyance of these potentials may be considered a public performance, the live 
transmission of which can be fixed if it is permanently recorded (e.g., via machin-
ima recordings; Copyright Act, § 101).
As to whether an avatar is original, it must be (a) distinctive and detailed 
enough to be distinguished from generic, similar characters, which are treated as 
unprotectable ideas (Gaiman v. McFarlane, 2004) and (b) sufficiently different 
from previous copyrightable characters, unless the derivative character was created 
with authorization (Copyright Act, § 103(a)). It must be acknowledged that many 
avatars (say, in an MMO where avatars are often quite similar) are not sufficiently 
different from preexisting characters and not distinct from avatarial tropes in a 
given game. Nonetheless, it is likely that some (perhaps many) user-crafted ava-
tars are imbued with the minimal “creative spark” required for originality (cf. Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 1991).
But who is the font of this creativity—who is the creative author? From a 
deterministic perspective, a game developer may claim to be the author, because 
the avatar cannot be anything that the game’s designers and programmers do not 
allow it to be. This view, however, overlooks the fact that the avatar is much more 
than just code—the program constrains but does not dictate the avatar’s customiz-
able expressions. Depending on the degree to which players can influence the form 
and function of on-screen content (Steuer, 1992), games necessarily give play-
ers some degree of freedom that may warrant copyrightable authorship in avatar 
appearance and behavior within the program’s constraints. If a game offers a suf-
ficient range of interactivity and player choice such that the productive gameplay 
can no longer be said to be solely authored by the developer, the player must be 
considered to have some degree of original authorship (Ochoa, 2012). By analogy, 
a word-processing program or paint program is copyrightable, but the literary and 
artistic works produced with those tools are not owned by the program’s copyright 
holder (Berkla v. Corel Corp, 1999). Thus, in a game that offers only a limited range 
of customization options and limited interactivity (e.g., moving left or right and 
jumping only), the developer could be said to be the sole author of any avatars, 
since any player customization is limited and all avatars are derivative of the basic 
template. However, given that most games today afford a wide range of options 
for avatar customization by appearance, abilities, behavior, and speech, it cannot 
be said that a game developer is the sole author of such an avatar—at a minimum, 
the player must be considered a joint author of the avatar.
o n  j o i n t  au t h o r s h i p  a n d  o w n e r s h i p
Let us return now to the question of who owns an avatar. The Copyright Act 
accounts for four types of collaborative authorship: works of joint authorship, 
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derivative works as successive authorship, works made for hire, and collective 
works (§§ 101, 103, 201). These forms of authorship depend on the relationship 
among collaborators and on the nature of their contributions, and these forms 
in turn determine ownership. Notably, however, none of these four frameworks 
account for the collaborative dynamics between MMO developers and players. 
While it is beyond the scope of this short chapter to delve into the nuances of fit 
(for this, see Ochoa, 2012), suffice it to say that each disadvantages one or both 
parties without fully addressing the contributions of both.
Given a choice of four imperfect options, an MMO is perhaps best consid-
ered a collective work (an option that provides some protection to both player and 
developer contributions), and individual avatars perhaps are best viewed as sepa-
rately copyrightable contributions to that collective work (because many games 
afford customization systems requiring considerable player creativity). If so, it 
must still be determined who owns the copyright to those avatars as contributions. 
Should a specific avatar be counted as a joint work of the game provider (providing 
the template) and the player (fleshing out that template)?
It may be useful to consider each avatar as a compilation—a work in which 
“preexisting materials … are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that 
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship” (Copy-
right Act, § 101). An avatar can be viewed as a selection and arrangement of 
components provided by the game developer, in which case the player would be 
considered the author through his or her lawful selection and arrangement and may 
claim copyright (Copyright Act, § 201(c)). Thus, the game developer owns the 
program and audiovisual content copyrights (created by employee-programmers 
as work made for hire), while the program delivers to players the raw materials for 
avatar creation. A player selects from these materials, arranging them in an origi-
nal, creative way to form an avatar (a compilation) that is then contributed to the 
MMO (a collective work). Viewed in this way, developers would enjoy a default 
statutory privilege to use the avatar in certain ways, but players could arguably 
enforce their avatar copyrights outside of the game.
t h e  va lu e  a n d  f u t u r e  o f  avata r  o w n e r s h i p
The previous discussion begs a question: should copyright law provide rights to 
players? Consider the question in light of the two principal rationales for copyright 
protection: the utilitarian model (predominant in common-law countries) and the 
natural-rights model (predominant in civil-law countries). On one hand, the utili-
tarian perspective posits that copyright exists to benefit the public by encouraging 
(through rights and economic protections) the creation and distribution of new 
literary and artistic works (e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 
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1985). Copyrights and patents may be granted to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, 
§ 8, cl.8). This view suggests that only game developers should be owners of ava-
tars, since the creation of MMOs is the type of capital-intensive endeavor which 
most heavily relies on the financial incentive provided by copyright ownership. The 
game engine, the character-creation system, and the avatar’s integration with the 
gameworld all require significant investment to create. Developers often rely on 
monetization of these properties through other media forms to cover development 
and maintenance costs, and the development of such derivative works could be 
inhibited if players could assert copyright claims to avatars. Conversely, players do 
not require monetary incentives to create avatars—they do it for entertainment, 
and often pay for the right to do it.
On the other hand, the natural-rights perspective suggests that one has a nat-
ural right to profit from the products of one’s artistic labors (Locke, 1690). In this 
vein, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that “[e]veryone 
has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author” 
(Article 27). From this perspective, players should indeed own their avatars, as 
they have invested time, money, and creative effort into the avatar through cus-
tomization and gameplay, and so deserve to be compensated if that investment is 
exploited by another. In other words, it would be unfair for game companies to 
benefit from player labor without compensation. In tandem, however, both per-
spectives advise against considering MMOs as joint works and avatars as deriv-
ative works, because these framings would not accurately reflect both companies’ 
and individuals interests and would disrupt commercial dealings relative to those 
interests. Instead, each avatar should be considered a joint work (jointly owned by 
the player and the game provider) that is a contribution to a collective work, the 
MMO (Ochoa, 2012). The fact that this proposed solution is an imperfect fit, 
however, highlights how the theoretical and practical dimensions of interactive 
media content ownership are not easily and neatly aligned.
It is likely that as videogame play and other forms of interactive media use 
become more complex—through technological advances like virtual reality, social 
evolutions such as user literacies, and industry shifts toward specific content and 
sales models—so too will issues of authorship and ownership become more com-
plex. For instance, as game programming becomes a mainstream skill set, how does 
one parse out the integration of platform-delivered code with player-created code, 
as with the complex compilations of game-native and user-crafted items compos-
ing avatars in Second Life (2003) and High Fidelity (2013)? And how might we 
untangle authorship and ownership of fixed works like Twitch gameplay streams, 
that draw on content from game companies, engaged creatively by players, but 
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are fixed by streaming companies? And might avatars themselves at some point 
deserve authorship credit, given impending advances in artificial intelligence? 
These and other unexpected collaborative authorship and ownership dilemmas 
will undoubtedly arise, requiring both theoretical and practical evaluations of these 
dynamics in ways that protect the interests of players, developers, and avatars alike.
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